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Abstract  
The intention of this paper is to review the historical presuppositions of the absence of the indigenous self-
naming of the Balkans, and to illuminate the consequences of external practices, mainly western of 
“producing” of Balkan identity - through Balkanist discourse of power. But to achieve this it is not enough to 
point out that the external construction of the narrative of the Balkans is often motivated by the domination 
interests, which is why we try to understand, and partly to bring into question, the theoretical assumptions of 
reduction identity to narratives, which is commonplace in today's social sciences. 
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Introduction 
This paper deals with three different issues. Firstly, how was it possible for the Westerners to construct the 
“Balkans” as they has been constructing it for two hundred old years, this serving not solely in the West but 
also throughout the world as the authoritative perception about the Balkan region, its culture and peoples? 
The discursive practice of constructing the Balkans identity for the purposes of this paper will be called 
(Western) “Balkanism”. Secondly, how come that the “Balkanites” have not done anything to “deconstruct” 
this mainly negatively connoted construction; and also how was it possible that not even before the 19th 
century, when a negative conceptive scheme of the Balkans solidified, nor have they ever afterwards been 
able to set up themselves differently in terms of identity construction? Thirdly, if the Balkans actually is an 
example of successful practice of (outside) constructing the cultural identity of a region, one wonders 
whether such a practice is subject to universalization. Therefore, the present paper will аlsо try to shed light 
on something that in recent decades has almost become a matter of theoretical self-evidence – that 
identity, especially a collective one, almost exclusively stands for a matter of construction. 
 
Constructing Balkan Identity 
In today’s humanities and social sciences there is quite an influential thesis of identity being a matter of 
narrative construction whereby effectively acting identities are often established by means of narrative self-
constructions. In this regard, for example, one of the most prominent 20th century philosophers, at the same 
time a proponent of narrative constructivism, Paul Ricouer, says the following: 
 
 “The identity of a group, a culture, a people, nation is neither an identity of unchangeable substance nor a solid 
structure but that of a narrated tale.“1  
 
Identity is certainly subject to narration but it is rather questionable if it can be told completely, 
whether it can be reduced to discourse as fully expressible, since after all it always carries grains of mere 
givens and also of affective-emotional traits, which generally speaking fail to be told. Therefore, as 
surpassing the words, it could be advisable to speak on identity as a sort of realistic, multi-layered, but still 
open-ended structure. The intention of Ricouers’s identity narrativization is to evade it being conceptualized 
as an ontic structure which resides in potentiality but instead, for the sake of its radical desubstantialization 
strives to reduce it solely to acts of identification. It is certainly possible that identity is (“infinitely”) talked 
about and still not to be “entirely” described – although it is not in itself “infinite” but rather stands for a 
definitive structure. Narrating encompasses identity, expresses it to an extent, but identity itself is nonpareil 
to the tale due to differences in the logical structure of narration, on the one hand, and idiosyncrasies of 
constructing identity devices, which in themselves, in addition to its intelligible side, also bear traits of mere 
factuality; and being such, it cannot be appropriately drawn in plain sight through verbalization. 
However, if even identity itself cannot be reduced to narrative constructions, still the fact of 
constant constructing of both ones’ own and others identities is beyond doubt. Certainly, when a man/group 
style themselves as being such and such, it is not as such sufficient for others to accept such self-invention 
at once. Therefore, in addition to “self-inventiveness”, it is necessary to muster enough strength, power, 
skill, prowess... So, for example, there is an self-construction of the Englishmen as gentlemen, which was 
                                                     
1 Paul Ricoeur, „Welches neue Ethos für Europa?“, p. 113. 
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primarily a construct of one class of English society which was subsequently, partly spontaneously, 
transposed in “out of Island” context to an a priory perception of the English nation. Of course, it is not 
necessary to stress that the presumption of typical “gentlemanhood” – be it of ruling class or of the entire 
nation, any nation, be in inner or outer social framework – is hard to reconcile with historical experience. An 
ethical uniformity of entire nation or class is hardly imaginable. And the USA, on their part, have styled 
themselves as “the land of freedom”, although one has witnessed so many times, let’s say, “exceptions”. 
Apparently, in some cases for the self-inventions of cultures, are widely accepted outside the 
realms of their original occurance. The question rises how this did not work out for the “Balkanites”? Is this 
because they are inherently “weak” and did not have enough strength to impose their self-conception to the 
rest of the world? No, because the primary self-perception of Balkan peoples – all along recent times when 
some of them, usually due to stigma imposed from outside factors (e.g. the Serbs) or issues with 
recognizing their own self-naming (e.g. the Macedonians) seek refuge in “Balkanhood” – did in no way 
relate to it but to their respective national frameworks. In the Balkans there were no Balkanites as the 
“Balkanites” – until they were “informed” of that from outside, that is, until others invented them, 
establishing them as the “Balkantes”, and newly some of them as “Western Balkanites”. Naturally, once this 
establishing is made, as soon as one confirms one’s power over the symbolic-referential framework which 
governs construction of identity of particular space and groups, it subsequently comes easy, to shuffle and 
re-deal (identity) “cards” again, at one’s own discretion. 
The so-called “Balkan identity”, whose “existence” out of discourse, to put it mildly, is dubious, was 
not the subject of explicit imaginary efforts of the Balkan nations themselves. Accordingly, once they were 
told that they belonged to the “Balkanites”, there was nothing they could do but find in the “basket” of 
“Balkanhood” which was not by the others placed there. And how do things look when it comes to national 
self-constructions of the Balkan nations. All Balkan nations have their own perceptions of themselves, 
which, understandably enough indicate rather a one-sided self-esteem than unbiased attitude. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting enough how those self-constructions in some cases resonate very well in the 
West – but only if being in line with the West’s long-term interests and intentions to rearrange the Balkan 
region. It is then possible, for one and the same people either to be placed in negative imagery framework 
of Balkanism, or to drag it occasionally out of it and present it in a more desirable light, which nevertheless 
by no means suspends the continuing validity of the “Balkanist” interpretative scheme. This does not mean 
that the people in question in some other circumstances will not again be re-designed in accordance with 
“semantic confinement” of Balkanism. The positive self-perception could interfere with positive 
constructions of certain Balkan peoples in the West, and subsequently circulated in global public 
communication, solely if standing in accordance with Western interests – and not because of inherent 
persuasiveness of their self-constructions.2 Therefore, depending on current interest constellation, one and 
the same Balkan people may be depicted in a positive or negative light, accordingly, as being notoriously 
“Balkanic” or as an welcome “exception” to the Balkan “muddle”. The Balkan people itself has no power of 
making relevant “decision” on their identity recognition, or can even do next to nothing to contribute to a 
more favourable outcome, since it has been mostly reduced to a cultural-interpretative object. 
The Balkan peoples’ identities, or rather what their communicative substitution is, can be 
successful, i.e. their self-constructions could be accepted outside the Balkans – only provided there is 
support from influential outside hetero-constructing powers. How does one “become”, to pose a naïve 
                                                     
2 Thus, for example, in the Encyclopaedia Britannica from 1997, Greece is not classified as a Balkan country, although the matter 
is quite obvious in geographical terms. On the other hand, as a result of the Greek economic crisis, which affects a broader 
European region, the predilection for the Greeks to be “returned” to the imaginative Balkans has revived. 
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question, an identity-constructing “power”? It is not enough only to repeat something many times and to 
have sufficient economic and military strength in order for one’s conception to gain appropriate 
persuasiveness and broadest resonance. The Balkans is, however, apparently, for various reasons, a 
region of an inherent imagological weakness, as a result of which it is extremely dependable on outside 
inputs. This is the reason why among Balkan peoples is sometimes given almost a mythical significance to 
creating a “positive picture of itself” in the West. Does the fact that Balkan self-images cannot be accepted 
in the West without a powerful patron, unlike, for example, self-images of the Irish, Scandinavians or the 
Portuguese, mean that Balkan self-constructions are utterly unpersuasive or perhaps that the Balkans is 
geopolitically such an important region that enormous amounts of energy are put into “metropolitan” 
production images thereof? The process of exchanging, accepting as well as correcting self-perceptions 
and hetero-perception should in normal case flow spontaneously, so that by means of interaction between 
them and actual experiences some approximate “truths” of certain groups’ identities with the passage of 
time solidify. Still, in case of the Balkans that simply did not work out.3 
 
Identity: Reality or Construction? 
If there are successful and unsuccessful cases of identity self-construction, and identity hetero-
construction, does that mean that ability to impose own “readings”, at times mere fabrications, as identity-
related “reality itself”, generally depends on power distribution? 
Perhaps one of the fantasies of those who run the world could be to make as widely accepted as 
possible the conviction that this is so, and accordingly that all efforts to show what the truth on reality itself 
is, and consequently any cognitive resistance to interest-directed, “smooth” production of (other) cultures’ 
and civilizations’ and groups’ identity are futile – because ostensibly there is simply no any reality outside 
the ruling representations. Then every outcry of the oppressed groups, needy or simply the ones who think 
to see what really is going on in the world, how sometimes even naked lies are used to manipulate groups, 
classes, peoples, states and civilizations, would be understood as a tragicomic “prattle” of those who do not 
realize what nowadays the “truth” is, actually what the truth of the truth is – and that is that the “truth” is only 
what institutionalized power says that it is. In addition, in our postmodern times, it has increasingly seemed 
that the “very reality” is powerless and ineffectual vis-a-vis the strategies of its interest-related 
representations and that, so to speak, it has become “light”, virtually worthless, and the image thereof has 
in return become “everything”. That would be a special type of “image” which would decreasingly be an 
image of something that precedes it, but more a sort of self-image, an image of its own, which ultimately, 
struggles to abolish its image character and establish itself as (if it were) reality itself, as “image-reality”. 
Has presentia been abolished in favour of pervasive self-referential, imperial representation, which 
by “making reality vanish” loses its primary, representative character.4 The thesis of narrative identity 
constructing has a (post)structuralist background according to which before establishing a language code, 
field of designation and the like, reality as reality simply does not exist in any relevant sense. With this the 
dual paradigm being–thinking, that is, the developed dual paradigm transformed into a trialism being–
language–thinking, is effectively transformed into unitary paradigm in which reality, i.e. the principle of 
                                                     
3 More on the topic see in author’s text: “The Balkans, Europe’s Distant Back Yard”. 
4 Jean Baudrilliard, Fragments, p. 44/5: “The real does not exist. […] There is a reality effect […].We have only our 
representations.” But, Baudrilliard is, unlike those who “preach” reduction of reality on its discursive representation, well aware of 
final consequences of “destruction” of reality: “Indeed, the two things goes together: the real is also made up of this possibility of 
the subject representing itself as such. […]. [t]here’s not even the possibility for subject of recovering the representational whole. 
We’re beyond representation, or have fallen back short or it. At any rate, we’re outside it.” (ibid. p. 45). 
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reality, loses independence whatsoever. Identity can be considered as a self-contained narrative-
imagological construction, supposing that the subject reference is devoid of any autonomous content – 
outside the established, interest-loaded system of reference. The theoretical point of departure of such a 
way of thinking is that the truth in general has the meaning only as truth for someone, which is further 
connected with anthropocentric position of the man as the measure of all things. However, it turns out that 
in reality this “measure” is not some humanistic general Man but those structures and authorities which in 
human interaction impose themselves as the most capable of pushing their perspective as the truth. At the 
end it turns out that the powerful ones are measure of all things, so that anthropocentrism in praxis emerge 
as eurocentrism or occidental-centrism All of the above may lead to conclusion that the perspective on the 
“subject” is formed through interests of a power-satiated language regime inside of which it is being 
established, so any sense of purpose which would go beyond its formation within the narrative perspective 
is excluded. 
This unitary scheme Being(-only)-in-narration can work solely when the very narrative correlate 
does not exist in reality prior to and independently from narration, as is, for example, the case with literature 
characters and events – or where ways are found to prevent acquiring direct information and cognition of a 
man, phenomenon, cultural area, etc. Then in their place narratizations of them are introduced, and they 
are getting – for the primary (i.e. “metropolitan”) audience, culture – represented only with narration itself, 
so that otherwise, outside of it, they are effectively nothing; in other words, as such, they are absent from 
horizon of reality, they are then not mere constructs but “ghosts” of an self-referent imaginary world which 
refuses to accept their transimaginary sense – not to speak of comparing it to imaginary constructs thereof. 
Hence, what is at hand here is absolutizing the fictional identity, so that real people, nations, cultures have 
an ontic status similar to imagined literary heroes. Indeed, the members of the group from the "remote" 
cultures, “marginal life-worlds”, acquire at the end the character of heroes of uncontrolled western fiction.5 
In short, image, narration (of something) etc. may become everything only if and when (its) reality 
becomes nothing.6 For example, this is the case with the Balkans, which even when it tries to say 
something about itself, is denied in his “right to speak”, i.e. the right to present itself – no matter how 
erroneously, falsely may it perhaps be – but still to say on its own something about itself.7 And it was 
therefore possible for the “Balkans” to get in the West an epistemological status not merely of its 
conception of the region or even its interpretation, but to stay as very reality of the Balkans. This entirely 
abolishes reality in favour of the image thereof so that the image, as is the case in conceptive world of 
“natural” peoples, becomes equal to reality itself. Curiously enough, it turns out that as the reversed side of 
theories of exclusively image-narrativistic character of identity/reality stand the images that in world-wide 
communication serves as reality per se. Does it mean that one theory/ideology support the other? With the 
conviction that there is nothing (real) outside narration, structure, language, system, code, by 
understanding that each object as such is generally established only when placed within already accepted 
                                                     
5 Books of Vesna Goldsworthy (Inventing Ruritania) and Božidar Jezernik (Wild Europe) suply with rich material on that topic. 
Still, the conveniente formulation of the issue we can find by Larry Wolff:”By the same token, real travelers to Eastern Europe 
brought along and gave free rein for their imaginative and philosophical preconceptions, so that the image that emerged from 
their accounts was often conditioned by an element of fantasy.” (Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 90). 
6 In similar vein, one can find by Larry Wolff a very brief “definition” of marginal parts of Europe as „the other Europe that waited 
to become ’known’.” (Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 90). The far-reaching dependence on other’s “knowledge” of some regions 
stands for real marginality, irrelevance of its reality as such. 
7 An illustrative example of the strategy of denying the “Balkans” the right to speak of itself, of its being reduced to a mute object 
(from which logos is taken away and, accordingly, if the man is a Aristotelian being having logos – which has been 
dehumanised), is the destruction of the Serbian Broadcasting Corporation by NATO bombers in 1999. 
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frames, it is unthinkingly, albeit with serious theoretical apparatus, basically restored archaic attitude, which 
cannot differentiate its conceptions of reality from reality itself and which consequently can never wonder 
about the suitability of its image of reality itself. Culture critics like Adorno, Kassirer and Gehlen had warned 
decades ago of neo-barbarian reversal of modern Western man, so it should not be surprising, that at the 
end one of leading currents in nowadays humanistic is getting closer to primal imagery. 
Nevertheless, this con-fusion of image and reality should be indicated as an anomaly, an exception 
rather than a normal case based on which a comprehensive theory should be created. In general, reality 
must be somehow, at least to certain sense, existing also outside from the representational systems, 
although, admittedly, we could not access it without them. Still, it by no means follows that reality should be 
left to the mercy of arbitrary conveying and reading of accidental or intentionally created representational 
systems, as mechanisms of ostensibly sovereign constructing of social sense. If the systems of 
representing/coding reality cannot be constructed with exact precision because being dependant of some 
irreducible accidental factors, that does not mean that on this basis no system of representation can be 
created, on whose suitability, not to say adequacy, to reality one can speak of. 
Some guidelines for thinking how to reach certain necessities of cognitive findings despite 
contingency of cognitive means could, for example, be found in Edmund Husserl, the founder of 
phenomenology. He attempts to bridge the gap between being and thinking by a form of pseudo-unitary 
theoretical paradigm. This, nevertheless, could not work in monological manner because inside it would not 
be at work only some “sovereign” thinking, but instead through thinking, as ideally devised, reality itself 
should be allowed to speak for herself – not as absorbed by representation, but one should „take it as it 
presents itself“.8 So, discourse would surpass itself towards very reality.9 Its pattern to that extent, unlike 
the narrative post-structuralist one and other strong unitary models, is characterised by deliberate false 
unitarity. As a reminder, in early 20th century Husserl commenced a colossal attempt to overcome a dual 
scheme reality–thinking by transforming the process of recognizing and establishing reality into an inner-
conscious occurance. Still, although objectivity is constituted solely as a correlate of consciousness, this 
noema, which is his terminus technicus, is not exposed to arbitrariness of noesa, i.e. pure thinking. 
Once this kind of thinking proceeds with certain objectivity, it exists for it within an already set 
horizon of expectation of sense (Sinnerwartung). That horizon is further a correlate of a factually 
established representational system, and to that extent must contain some accidental, unexplained, 
unverified elements, or simply that what is an expression of current identity and mental attitude of the 
observing subject. Therefore Husserl insists on removing such factual-accidental elements by their so 
called “bracketting” (Einklammerung). At the same time, in the process of interaction between 
consciousness and noema, the former, lead with its eidetic intuition, should move in the direction of 
deepening its initial expectations of sense, by revealing their correlation with empirical content, for which it 
is believed that corresponds to given noema. This would eventually – should the expectation horizon of 
sense be in line with the intention towards the sense of actual act of conscience – make possible to glance 
ideal “essences” whose correlates are valid as being real. In this, the term reality would be constructed in 
epistemological-methodological terms rather than on the basis of apprehension of the pre-theoretical 
                                                     
8 Edmund Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 18. 
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method, p. 470: “The speculative mode of being of language has a universal ontological 
significance. To be sure, what comes into language is something different from the spoken word itself. But the word is a word 
only because of what comes into language in it. Its own physical being exists only in order to disappear into what is said.” 
Besides, bearing in mind the speculative meaning of German verb aufheben in its philosophical use, it would be more accurate 
to put “in order to overcome itself into what is said” at the end of the citation. 
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position on what is “real”.10 This manner of foundation, which connects criteria of comprehensiveness and 
consistency, serves as a replacement for direct contact with reality, which according to early and late 
Husserl, due to the thesis of consciousness’ absoluteness – is impossible. A particular referential system of 
cognizance, if not conveniently set up, could not shed additional light on noematic spheres, and therefore 
should be rejected or rearranged in the process of conscious experience.  
Still although Husserl devised subjectivity as purified, i.e. as self-purifying, of all cultural, historical 
and generally of all given elements, he eventually, in his late phase, realised that not only was it impossible 
but, just the opposite, in vicinity of a cognitive subject, which he termed the life-world, should be the factual 
starting point for acceptable illumination of the world. This vicinity of the life-world, when something is 
known on the basis of it simply and directly, is the foundation of subject’s certainty – which is basically 
posited outside the representational systems. Moreover, this tectonic arch-certainty, what is profoundly 
there as a kind of “gut” felt certainty, is factual, although mostly un-reflected, pre-requisite for any possible 
(“fruitful”) representational system.11 Still also the late Husserl failed to take in account the linguistic side of 
representation, which made his contributions vulnerable. 
 
 
„Building” Identity and (Un)successful Narration 
Following this theoretical introduction, we are now in a position to pose the question is there such a thing as 
“Balkan identity”? It makes sense to talk about separate Balkan peoples’ identities – however we may 
determine this term conceptually, but not necessarily about a super-Balkan identity as such. It is rather 
allowed to speak of regional typicality, just like one can talk about Central European, Scandinavian, British 
or Iberian typicality. And typicalities are, for their part, halfway between the “pseudo-substantial” 
Identitarian core and something which is entirely singular, accordingly pure factual. They serve as an 
epistemological means of self-identifying, that is hetero-perception, which is important in everyday reflexive 
orientation. As a matter of fact no collective pseudo-essences correspond to them. At first we recognise 
other’s collective identities through a perception of typicality they give off, but by cataloguing such 
typicalities no core of collective identities can be reached. 
When can one know that it is acceptable on basis of recognised typicalities to speak about the 
presence of some sort of collective identity? Only if it is possible to phenomenologically confirm a coherent, 
auto-interpretative fruitful we-sense of persons belonging to a certain group, which constitutes their primary 
collective self-identification. A student cannot reach collective identities directly, except perhaps – but even 
though to an limited extent, in his own case, but only through observing identifications. corresponding them. 
This means that if an identity is to assert, it has to express itself through respective identifications, while it is 
impossible to do the same in the opposite direction, since there are plenty of mere situational, random 
identifications which are not an indicator of any identities that would underlie them. One could finally say, 
                                                     
10 Edmund Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, р. 37: “And this In-itself comes to givenness. And yet it is in 
principle never given in an absolute way. Its meaning is always only an opinion in the sense that it always stands in need of 
evidence that can never be given definitively. And consequently, the Being-In-Itself of a thing is, in regard to knowledge, also 
always a presumption, insofar as we never really get rid of the experiential consciousness. [...] In thoughtful experiencing, 
something is posited for which the being-experienced is in itself contingent...” 
11 Edmund Husserl, Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man, p. 10: ”The investigator of nature, however, does not make it 
clear to himself that the constant foundation of his admittedly subjective thinking activity is the environing world of life. This latter 
is constantly presupposed as the basic working area, in which alone his questions and his methodology make sense.” 
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where ever one can speak on an identity, it addresses corresponding identifications as an answer does a 
question. 
Let us once more revisit the thesis of narrative identity creation, but now in more practical context. 
If identity is simply a matter of narration, if it straightforwardly produces identities, then, presumably, if 
sufficient “narrative effort” is put into it – a corresponding identity should emerge. Still, to give an example, 
when the dismantlement of the Eastern communist bloc was the objective, plenty of intellectual (and not 
only) energy was invested in – here it is quite suitable to use the term without any hesitancy whatsoever – 
the construction of the Central Europe identity (Mitteleuropa), which for her part allegedly was ruthlessly 
oppressed under alien “Orthodox”, “Mongolian”, “semi-oriental”…(so polemical narratives of the time, 
mostly among writers) – in a nutshell, Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, when the Cold War was over by one 
side winning and particular parts of Europe joining the Western alliance, the “production” of Central 
European narrations went quiet nearly overnight. Even the Germans mention less frequently a one-time 
favourite, so called “Eastern Central Europe”, as the object of their continuous expansionistic aspirations 
since Middle Ages. The reason for this is quite obvious. Former non-Russophone Eastern Europe was 
absorbed into the Euro-Atlantic world, while the Germans’ exclusive interest zone east of their borders was 
not recognized. So the so called “Central European identity” became redundant for everyone, even for 
those who during the 80’s bitterly wept over their sad fate under the “uncultured intruders” from the East.12 
If narrations really produce identities, and more than two decades of serious intellectual efforts in a wide 
region from Vancouver to Vilnius should absolutely not be underestimated as resource for identity 
production, how could any of us today overlook the vivid “Central Europeanism"? The problem, however, is 
that almost no one feels it because one cannot encounter it in one’s memory, in collective emotionality, not 
to speak intentionality. This example shows that narrations, however rhetorically ardent, at times frenetic, 
well-coordinated, cannot produce collective (super)identities at will – if some pre-narrative prerequisites are 
not fulfilled. 
Similar to “Central European Identity”, no one on the Balkans feels “Balkan identity”, but unlike 
Central Europe, production of its identity is not over. The question is – why? Because of successful 
integration of Central Europe in Western world, which failed on Balkans? Then identity production has more 
to do with appropriation of particular cultural space than with its theoretical interpretation. In that case one 
can only wonder if production of Balkan is expression of frustration because of its failed integration into the 
West, or is it rather the means of the integration, or even perhaps a way to keep the region permanently 
out? 
Narration can serve the purpose of generating, or better: stabilizing, identity if among the 
population of a region already exists a kind of we-sense, encouraging the weaving of corresponding we-
narrations. In order to be born, this sense in most cases requires a single, exceptional event which would 
later be reconstructed as source of that we-sense.13 It is therefore not accidental that almost all national 
myths insist on identifying such formative events. The national myth is a tale of an event that initiated our 
“we-ness”. In cases when they are non-existing, they simply need to get invented, not to say fabricated. 
Nevertheless, the key point is that collective identities have an event-related, pre-narrative pretext, a kind of 
complex occurrence, followed only then by self-observation, self-understanding and narrative consolidation 
of identity. So there could be no mention of an arbitrary narrative production of collective identities ex nihilo, 
which is nowadays believed by many, including some theoreticians. 
                                                     
12 More on topic to find in: Jacques Rupnik, “Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?”. 
13 Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, p. 60 f. 
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How is it possible that some narrations get crystallized to the identity stage, while the others do not 
have that same power; why do they generate less stable identity-like structures, while third ones, which are 
the vast majority, do not produce anything seemingly stable? In short, with the theorem of narrative identity 
construction of collective identities, it is unclear how can one in principle differentiate (potentially) 
constitutive from (potentially) non-constitutive narrations. This would be more preferable than only a 
posteriori to determine that some narrations happened to be factually successful while others were not. 
Besides, are constitutive/“successful” narrations different from non-constitutive/“unsuccessful” ones 
in respect of the level of their conclusiveness, persuasiveness, brilliance, imaginativeness? That is hardly 
the case, because, back to the already mentioned example of the discursive production of “Central 
Europe”, it was worked on by many great minds on both sides of the “Iron curtain”, and still there is nothing 
left than a mere tale, so, nothing more than a conglomerate of identity devoid narrations which increasingly 
slip into oblivion. On the other side, once we get familiar with some of the empirically known, 
institutionalized national and other collective narratives, it can be seen that even a rather “idle (identitarian) 
talk” can be efficient. Obviously it seems very hard to work out the criteria for separation of successful from 
unsuccessful narrations. The contingency of emerging of collective identities is hardly to avoid even at the 
level of its theoretical reflection, which does not mean it is impossible to “control” them reflexively. 
At the end it seems that the ultimate objective consequence, although not necessarily the 
subjective intention, of discourse about the narrative construction of identities is just a conviction of 
inseparability of correct from incorrect discourse of collective entities, as supposedly real – because of lack 
of possibility to compare narration with reality itself.14  
 
 
The “Balkans” or the History of Failed Self-Naming 
Everything that exists needs to be named, and if one individual or group does not name oneself as a part of 
reality, it will inevitably be named by others. Today, when the “Balkans” is already “here” and well-known to 
everybody, the discourse of the “Balkans” is hardly to avoid – in the very Balkans and outside it. However, 
in doing this, it is desirable to stay within the limits of the theoretically fruitful and acceptable. But what is 
theoretically acceptable when speaking of something in such an emotional, historical but also erroneous 
and malicious discourse of it as a contaminated concept as Balkans is, it is not always easy to make out, 
especially being in the midst of confusion created by the primary ideological discourse of the Balkans. 
Undeniably, foreigners have not only ascribed but also imposed on the “Balkans” the name as well as 
provided a corresponding denotation and thus charged it with notions, imagery and emotions which, in line 
with their respective interests, as well as their own discretion, arbitrariness or simply miscomprehension, 
they read into. It is likely that the probability for that would have been somewhat slighter if the inhabitants of 
South Eastern Europe had timely named themselves, and then possibly made some, even a provisional 
sketch of their own identity, as the first step, which should be clearly also a move towards identity self-
protection. Nevertheless, why did this not happen? 
Let us here take a historical look. For its pre-modern inhabitants, the “Balkans” is a continental 
hinterland of coast – which are, accidentally, the cradle of Greek-European culture – and it never, up until 
                                                     
14 Rorty, one of the protagonists of narrativism, emphasize even that narrativism as such is to read as anti-theoretical turn: 
"general turn against theory and toward narrative“ (Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidariy, р. XVI). That this turn away from 
theory is not just casually spoken is confirmed with a further citation: “lronist theory must be narrative in form because the 
ironist's nominalism and historicism will not permit him to think of his work as establishing a relation to real essence; he can only 
establish a relation to the past.“ (ibid. 101). 
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modern times, was in terms of domicile self-perception integrated in a single, comprehensive region, within 
the imagery world neither of “Balkanites” nor non-“Balkanites”. The ancient Macedonians, although they 
were Hellenophone, were perceived by the Classical Greeks as barbarian intruders who from relative 
depths, for as much “geopolitically” uninteresting as culturally despised continent called “Europe”, barraged 
towards their “beloved” coasts.15 And the Ancient Greeks, for their part, perceived themselves as coastal 
people rather than “peninsular” one.16 This is why ancient times do not know any semantic, let alone any 
symbolic-topological or cultural-identity analogon to today’s “Balkanites”. Unlike some other European 
imperial nations, for which their (pen)insular geography constituted part of their national consciousness 
(Romans, Spaniards, British), that was not the case with the Greeks. They were and remained a 
Mediterranean, coastal people that was not only not interested for conquering the depths of mainland, with 
the exception of the magically attractive Orient, but that also neglected the continental heartland of Europe. 
Not even later, as the Byzantines, did they see themselves either as the “Balkan” or even “Anatolian” 
empire, since they were the successors of the empire created by Romaioi (the Romans, in Greek). Stara 
planina (the “Old Mountain”), in today's Bulgaria, after which the peninsula was actually named balkan 
(Turkish word for mountain in general), was called Hemos by the Greeks, and accordingly the Byzantines 
called the entire peninsula the “Hemos peninsula”. Nevertheless, the entity corresponding to this term in the 
Romaic symbolic geography was of limited significance. 
That could be confirmed from the fact that this name, indicatively enough, never took root, was 
never generally known as designation for the peninsula. If that had been the case, probably (some) 
Westerners since the 19th century till present day would have been somewhat constrained in mapping and 
ruling Europe’s easternmost peninsula with arbitrary naming. On the one hand, the “Balkanites”, as already 
mentioned, did not recognize themselves as “Balkanites” because in their symbolic world the peninsula was 
even not perceived as a single geographic-cultural unit, nor did they perceive themselves as the inhabitants 
thereof. All along modern times the gap between the “civilized” (at least in the past) Greek south of the 
peninsula and the rest, perceived as “barbarian” north, has survived. Additionally, none of those northern, 
ultimately Balkan peoples proper was a people of seafarers. Hence, for the Greeks/Byzantines, territories 
north of them were insignificant in cultural terms, however not always in military terms as well, while other 
peoples from the area never moved sufficiently off the coast of the Peninsula (Serbs and Bulgarian in the 
Middle ages created only continental, not maritime empires) thus making it possible for them to originally 
mentally perceive it as a single peninsula, in which case there would have been a more prominent need for 
its geographical determination. On the contrary, they barely survived for centuries within closed continental 
horizons, so for the majority of the “Balkanists”, up until modern times, the Balkans was seen primarily as a 
continent, rather than a peninsula. 
But how come that the lack of name for south-eastern Peninsula lasted so long without being 
noticed? The issue of (failure to) name Europe’s easternmost peninsula geographically was “smoke 
screened” by it being called politically “European Turkey”, after its then master. If the Ottomans had any 
other more substantial lands in Europe – and from Southern Russia/”Little Russia”, including Crimea, they 
were banished by the second half of the 18th century – then there would not have been the coincidence 
between the so called “European Turkey” and the ancient “Hemoic peninsula”, and in that case even the 
need to name the region more specifically would have arisen sooner. But being so, all the time till the 
                                                     
15 More on the topic in: Costa Carras, “Greek identity”, p. 303. 
16 A striking proof of this are spontaneous outbursts of enthusiasm (with shouts of "Sea, sea!" of hugging each other and crying 
soldiers) when the Greek army 401 years B.C. climbed the mountain Theches and saw the southeastern coast of the Black Sea, 
no matter how far it was from their homeland. (Xenophon, Anabasis IV, VII, 20–26; p. 331). 
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modern age, when its perception changed, decreasingly bearing ancient-middle age symbolic layers of 
ecumenical and imperial, and increasingly gets seen in more exact terms as a strategic, and ultimately 
geopolitical, region, the random historic-cultural name “European Turkey” becomes unsatisfactory – even 
because it became clear that Turkish presence in Europe did not have to last forever. That is primarily why 
it was absolutely necessary to come up with a name that would be generally accepted. 
For all those reasons it was inevitable for the region to be named from outside when modern times 
were about to commence, and subsequently to reach the Balkans itself. For sure, countries and stateless 
territories in the Balkans would not have been spared being treated as an object for international relations 
even if they had inherited from the past widely used and accepted self-naming – because only possession 
of strength, followed by solid cultural self-consciousness, can prevent it. Nevertheless, space for the 
instrumental, sometimes cynical “Balkanistic”, that is the ideological representation of the Balkans, which 
disguised the corresponding treating of the Balkans by Westerners, would have probably been lesser. And 
consequently, the politics of power (Machtpolitik) directed toward the Balkans which is often hidden behind 
do-gooder endeavor to “Europeanise”17 “semi-barbaric” South-East European peninsula, would have been 
somewhat more transparent and consequently probably less successful. But being as it is, by accepting 
this naming, through which is “smuggled” also fairly negative, equally by interests and ignorance charged 
“luggage”, many of the inhabitants of the unfortunate “Balkans” involuntarily, and nowadays increasingly 
voluntarily, accept and adopt the main stream interpretation of geography, culture and mentality related 
patterns of reasoning and behavior of the Balkanites, which are invented and imposed from outside.18 For 
as long as this is the case, for as long as conceptions of people from the Balkans region are run by others, 
for as long their self-consciousness “resides” someplace else, so that their self-understanding is not the 
fruit of their own self-relation – in the Balkans it will not be possible to generate authentic cultural-historical 
self-consciousness of neither national elites nor peoples themselves, while the occident-centric “Balkanist 
discourse” will continue to serve as a powerful, in its subversiveness mainly unfathomed tool of alien 
domination. 
If it wants to be liberated, in discursive terms, of the “Balkans” shackles, the real Balkans needs to 
start independently producing self-interpretation of its cultural-symbolic space – as all national 
particularities encompassing, and not only their respective national identity narrations, which by the way 
were frequently annulled because of being mutually antagonistic, and as a result produced suspicion 
concerning them even to well-intentioned individuals outside the Balkans and finally, to a certain extent, to 
individuals and groups in the very Balkan nations. If it wants to get rid of the “Balkans” stigma imposed by 
                                                     
17 German philosopher Liebsch, by introducing the term “counter-Europeanization”, apparently in the tradition of the German 
critique of enlightenment, which was termed as “counter-enlightenment” (Gegenaufklärung), indirectly warns of the perils of 
monopolising the term, and then of the practice of Europeanizing: „“It is exactly this threatening fate that should start the efforts 
against counter-Europeanization, which has become a “European problem” specifically because any other kind of 
Europeanization would mutually rip European ancestry and European future.” Old Europe is, accordingly, as a result of 
temporalized rationalization of life relations, unilaterally Europeanized. Against this a different kind of Europeanization is turned, it 
reminding of ancestry defying the former“ (Burkhard Liebsch, „Über einige Schwierigkeiten, Europas Europäisierung[en] zu 
denken“, р. 63). 
18 Even those scholars, as Serbian geographer and anthropologist Jovan Cvijić [Yovan Tsviyich] who got his prominence in first 
decades of 20th century, besides striving with much success to overcome the intellectual immaturity of the Balkan elites, 
confirmed, though unintentionally, the outside construction of Balkan’s identity with his famous saying that Serbs “built their 
house in the midst of highway”. Those who live on the road – and road livers always live on some other’s road – are doomed not 
to have peace in their house, perhaps not to finish their own house ever – if house metaphorically stands for identity. So the 
Balkans as roadside world is destined not to be completed as a self-contained one, but rather to stay in status of perpetual 
immaturity of transitional in-betweenness. 
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the “Balkanist discourse”, the Balkans needs to start speaking of itself as the Balkans, since the “discursive 
Balkans” is a narrative reality that can be put in a more realistic framework only with different, well-
contemplated, and as much as it is possible, more honest interpretations, but not mere counter-narratives. 
It is an entirely different issue whether this is reasonable to expect, as a consequence of 
accumulated mutual Balkan hostilities. Western political-historical-cultural discourse of dominance over the 
Balkans could hardly be so widely accepted – in the Balkans and outside it (as an internal and external 
Balkan-noia) – if the behaviour of relevant players in the South Eastern peninsula was not had been too 
frequently in accordance with discourse’s “predictions”. But this, again, is in good part because this region 
is run as if it were an object, to which not insignificantly contributes local interiorizing of such a discourse of 
power, so that “interpretation” of the current “Balkanist discourse“, whose more than two-hundred-year long 
tradition continues, emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Still it is jointly worked on not only by the Western 
discourse and actions of power but also by Balkan client-natured, corrupt political, as well as intellectual 
elites, which instead of a rational facing with the Balkanist discourse, while being not infrequently immature, 
proceed with its interiorizing, dissemination and confirmation. 
 
Conclusion 
The Balkans as “internally allien” to the West is intellectually and culturally barren for it, it does not enrich 
him with deeper self-awareness – unlike, say, the ancient Athenian perception of Sparta and Macedon, 
both as closer or further (inner-Hellenic) otherness –to put aside that fact that such an attitude often do 
injustice to the "Balkans" itself .Such otherness does not serve to (fertile) self-mirroring, self-understanding, 
but rather as a symptom, as the epitome of thwarted self-knowledge. Besides, a symptom of something 
objectively constitutes a sort of exclusively objectivized "knowledge" about it – but in a way that this 
knowledge is not available to it in reflective manner. Creation of negative value-loaded “Balkans” historically 
coincides with the exhaustion of the creative abilities of modern European culture – to turns its crisis into 
prospects for further improvement and progress. When a self-relationally based culture undergo a crisis, 
then her ability to self-criticism weaken – or remains closed within certain intellectual circles, deprived of a 
broader impact. She then s cease to make use of meeting with others, particularly the close ones, and 
eventually begins to perceive them primarily as problems and in terms of imagination as depository of 
negative traits. In doing so, these negative characteristics of others are, as a rule, reversed indication of 
own problems or own properties. The culmination of such a crisis symptomatology is European 
totalitarianism of the first half of the XX century, which all the problems of European civilization one-sidedly 
interpreted in a class or racial key, and subsequently as unique challenge of the Civilization were 
recognized a class or racial enemy, i. e. certain close, internal otherness. Precisely on the same 
(hetero)cultural foundation stands Balkanist discourse of XIX to XXI century. However, the modern code of 
“political correctness”, which is mainly formed on the basis of experiences with totalitarianism and other 
practices of submission and exclusion, simply does not protect the “Balkans” – presumably because 
Europe is not yet aware of doing ever injustices to it. 
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